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Abstract
Purpose: We explored the antecedents of sheriff deputies’ perceived legitimacy of their agency’s
citizen advisory council.
Design/methodology: We obtained survey data from 567 sheriff deputies in a southeastern state.
We first asked whether respondents knew their agency had a citizen advisory council, and then
asked those who responded affirmatively a series of questions about the legitimacy of the
council. We then ran an OLS regression that included organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and
public scrutiny as independent variables predicting perceived legitimacy of the citizen advisory
council.
Findings: Deputies who perceived greater organizational justice from command staff were
significantly more likely to perceive the citizen advisory council as legitimate.
Originality/value: In response to strained police/community relations, reform advocates have
urged the police to embrace a more democratic style of policing, including allowing for more
citizen oversight of agencies. Our study sheds light on how line-level officers perceive such
oversight.
Keywords: citizen oversight, organizational justice, self-legitimacy, public perceptions,
democratic policing, legitimacy
Paper type: Research paper
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Police Officers’ Attitudes toward Citizen Advisory Councils
In response to strained police-community relations (Weitzer 2015), reform advocates,
scholars, and progressive leaders have called for American policing to adopt a more democratic
style of policing (Ramsey and Robinson, 2015; Walker, 2016). For example, the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing advised agencies to encourage public engagement and
collaboration through the formation of citizen advisory councils (CACs; also commonly referred
to as citizen advisory committees, civilian review boards, and the like). Specifically, the Task
Force identified the need for CACs to assist in developing, revising, and advising on agency
policies, crime prevention strategies, and the adaptation of new technologies (Action item No.
3.2.1 and 4.5.3).
Although CACs may be appealing because they can improve transparency and public
trust, police are often cynical of both their organization’s leadership and the public (Paoline,
2003; Van Maanen, 1978). This cynicism leads to critical questions surrounding citizen
oversight: How do line-level officers feel about this oversight, particularly during a time of
strained police-community relations? Do they trust that the council has the community’s or
agency’s best interests in mind? Do they believe the council serves to enhance the organization’s
legitimacy in the eyes of the public? Do officers see the council as a form of community
policing? Lack of police support for CACs could have serious consequences: it may exacerbate
the “us v. them” problem, diminish police faith in their organization’s leadership, or cause
officers to do less in order to avoid scrutiny from civilians (Rushin and Edwards, 2017; Stone et
al., 2009). Understanding the factors associated with officers’ support for CACs is foundational
to ensuring that they are effective in their democratic policing intent.

2

The current study explored the factors associated with officers’ perceived legitimacy of a
CAC using survey data collected from a sheriff’s department in the southeastern US. Using a
sample of 567 deputies, we first asked respondents if they were aware of their agency’s CAC.
Deputies who were aware of their agency’s council were asked a series of questions about
potential benefits of the council, such as whether it helps their agency’s community policing
efforts or improves their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Drawing on prior studies, which
have examined support for other types of democratic policing, we also considered deputies’
perceptions of organizational justice, their self-legitimacy, and their perceptions of public
scrutiny. We expected each of these sentiments to be associated with their perceptions of their
CAC.
Democratic Policing
Successful policing in democratic societies is highly contingent on the level of consent
provided by citizens. The police cannot be effective if they do not garner consent from the
public; citizens must acknowledge the police as holding legitimate authority and they must
consent to being policed (Manning, 2015; Tyler, 1990). Policing by consent involves the public
willingly giving up some of their rights in exchange for protection from the police as
representatives of the government. This social contract facilitates cooperation and legal
compliance from the public. What is more, when the public believes the police hold legitimate
authority and consent to their power, they are more likely to empower the police; they are more
likely to trust the police have the appropriate expertise in deciding how best to fulfill their
mandate (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).
Consent from the public is best achieved through democratic styles of policing, which
can take a variety of forms (Walker, 2016). For example, officers can ensure democratic policing
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at the interaction-level by treating citizens with dignity and respect, allowing them a voice during
interactions, and clearly explaining the reasons for their decisions (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler,
1990; Wolfe et al., 2016). At the agency-level, many departments have adopted communityoriented policing models over the past few decades (Reisig, 2010). In practice, communityoriented policing varies considerably, but generally it involves integrating the public in decisionmaking processes. For example, community-oriented policing agencies typically elicit
participation from the public in devising strategies to combat crime and disorder problems in
their community (Goldstein, 1987; Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000).
Citizen oversight is another manifestation of democratic policing, which can be broken
down into three categories: investigation-focused, review-focused, and auditor/monitor-focused
(De Angelis et al., 2016; Walker, 2001, 2016). CACs are a review-focused form of oversight,
allowing the community to weigh in on internal policies, disciplinary matters, citizen complaints,
and other issues. Establishing CACs allows police agencies to provide the public a voice, ensure
citizens play a role in developing or revising the type of policing that ultimately impacts their
communities, and sends the message that together the police and public are part of the same
community. When implemented properly, CACs can be key to ensuring a democratic style of
policing for the public (Walker, 2016).
Perceived legitimacy of CACs by line-level officers is potentially key to their success.
Officers who view the council as more legitimate, for example, are likely more apt to accept the
council’s recommendations regarding policy and disciplinary matters. On the other extreme,
officers who do not trust their CAC may undermine its efforts by treating the public poorly on
the street. For example, officers who mistrust a council’s recommendations may be less trusting
of the public in general and be less likely to treat them in a procedurally fair manner (Bottoms
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and Tankebe, 2012). Officers who lack trust in such councils or believe they do not have their
agency’s or community’s best interests in mind may respond by withdrawing from their
responsibilities. De-policing may occur as a way of avoiding the perceived unfairness of citizen
oversight in the form of an advisory council (Oliver, 2017; Stone et al., 2009). Indeed, the push
for citizen oversight of police actions dates back at least to the Kerner Commission and was
historically resisted by police executives (Walker, 2016). The International Association of Chiefs
of Police, for example, released an official statement opposing citizen oversight in 1964 (Walker,
2016). Accordingly, understanding the factors associated with officers’ support for CACs is key
to developing new or improving existing councils. Agencies with CACs viewed as legitimate by
their line-level officers likely will be in a better spot to have such councils achieve their
democratic policing goals.
Theoretically Salient Predictors of Officer Attitudes
Toward CACs
Extant research has considered police officers’ commitment to various examples of
democratic policing including community-oriented policing (Myhill and Bradford, 2013) and
procedural justice (Tankebe, 2014a). CACs are yet another reflection of democratic policing, but
it is not clear how officers feel about giving citizens such oversight. Before turning to our
methodology and results, we discuss three potential antecedents of officers’ perceived legitimacy
of CACs – organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and public scrutiny.
Organizational Justice
Studies have long demonstrated the importance of organizational justice – that is, fairness
– within the workplace environment. Organizational justice is comprised of three elements:
distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. Distributive justice refers to the
extent that employees perceive the distribution of outcomes in their organization as fair (Adams,
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1963). For example, when managers fairly distribute salary increases, promotions, or disciplinary
actions (i.e., without favoritism), employees are more likely to be satisfied and to behave in ways
that benefit the organization, such as putting in extra effort (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001;
Lind and Tyler, 1988). In contrast, procedural justice refers to the extent employees believe they
are treated fairly by their organization. Specifically, employees want their voices heard and to
know that processes are unbiased and consistent (Levanthal, 1980). Again, extant research
demonstrates that employees who feel their organization adheres to fair procedures are more
likely to engage in beneficial behaviors (Colquitt et al., 2001). The third element – interactional
justice – pertains to honesty and politeness by supervisors during interpersonal communication
with employees (Bies and Moag, 1986).
Police departments are similar to other business settings – they are hierarchically
structured and they consist of employees working toward the same goals. Thus, criminologists
have increasingly begun to explore the effects of organizational justice within police
departments. Collectively, this body of research suggests that like employees in other fields,
officers tend to be more satisfied and committed to their jobs when they are treated fairly by their
organization (Donner et al., 2015). Bradford et al. (2014), for example, showed that perceptions
of organizational justice were associated with greater identification with the agency and
procedural compliance (see also Rosenbaum and McCarty, 2017; Tyler et al., 2007). Likewise,
Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that perceived organizational justice was associated with less
misconduct.
Other recent studies suggest that the benefits of organizational justice extend beyond the
walls of the department and into the community, in the form of commitment to democratic
policing. Studies by Haas et al. (2015) and Van Craen and Skogan (2017), for example, indicate
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that “internal” procedural justice (i.e., by the supervisors in a department) is associated with
support for greater restrictions on the use of force. Myhill and Bradford (2013) showed
organizational justice predicted higher levels of commitment to community-oriented policing.
Similarly, Tankebe (2014a) showed officers who perceived greater fairness within their
department were significantly more supportive of exercising procedural justice during their
interactions with citizens. Trinkner and colleagues’ (2016) study illuminated the causal
mechanisms underlying such results. Specifically, they demonstrated that organizational justice
was associated with greater perceived legitimacy of the agency, less cynicism, and less
psychological distress among officers. In turn, these outcomes were all directly associated with
commitment to democratic policing in the form of increased support for community policing and
procedural justice during citizen interactions, and decreased support for the use of coercive force.
We are unaware of any studies that have explored the relationship between perceived
organizational justice and attitudes toward CACs, but based on the available literature, we
developed the following hypothesis:
1. Deputies who perceive their command staff and organization’s policies as more fair
will afford greater legitimacy to their CAC.
Self-Legitimacy
Another potential antecedent of officers’ perceived legitimacy of CACs is the confidence
they have that their authority as police officers is morally justified – that is, their self-legitimacy
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Studies have established a positive correlation between selflegitimacy and outcomes like organizational commitment and identity, as well as a negative
correlation between self-legitimacy and cynicism (Bradford and Quinton, 2014; Tankebe and
Meško, 2015). Recent research suggests self-legitimacy is also associated with endorsement of
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democratic policing. For instance, Bradford and Quinton (2014) demonstrated that officers with
greater self-legitimacy were more committed to exercising procedural justice with citizens and
protecting their due process rights. In the US, Wolfe and Nix (2016a) found that self-legitimacy
was strongly associated with officers’ willingness to engage in community partnerships. Again,
we are not aware of any studies that have explored the direct relationship between selflegitimacy and attitudes toward CACs. However, given the overlap between these
aforementioned manifestations of democratic policing and CACs, officers who possess greater
self-legitimacy should be more embracive of (or less worried about) the transparency and
oversight that a CAC may provide. Accordingly, we test the following hypothesis:
2. Deputies who express greater self-legitimacy will afford greater legitimacy to their
CAC.
Public Scrutiny
A third possible predictor of officers’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy is the extent they
believe citizens support the police. In recent years, there has been growing concern about
criticism of the police, such that the U.S. citizenry is waging a “war on cops” (Maguire et al.,
2017; Morin et al., 2017; Nix et al., 2018). At least one study suggests officers believe the media
is generally biased and hostile toward their profession (Nix and Pickett, 2017). Further
complicating matters, the same study revealed that those who felt the media was more hostile
toward police were more likely to believe the public is distrusting of them and more fearful of
being falsely accused of misconduct.
The idea that police officers are distrusting of citizens is nothing new. Ethnographic
studies of police organizations carried out nearly half a century ago suggested that police officers
harbored cynical attitudes toward citizens, viewed them as unsupportive and “out to make the
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police look bad” (Van Maanen, 1978:322), and embraced an “us versus them” mentality
(Skolnick, 2011). Sparrow et al. (1990:51) provide the following illustrative quote from a police
officer:
No one else understands the real nature of police work. That is, no one outside the police
service – academics, politicians, and lawyers in particular – can comprehend what we
have to do. The public is generally naïve about police work…Members of the public are
basically unsupportive and unreasonably demanding. They all seem to think they know
our job better than we do.
Distrust of citizens and support for aggressive styles of policing remain prevalent
elements of police subculture (Paoline, 2003). These attitudes serve as barriers to policing
reforms including those that emphasize democratic ideals (Schulhofer et al., 2011; Skogan,
2008). Indeed, one recent study demonstrated that alignment with such a “traditional police
culture” was associated with less support for exercising procedural justice with citizens and more
support for using coercive force (Silver et al., 2017). Likewise, it seems unlikely that officers
who are afraid citizens are out to get them or make them look bad would be receptive to the idea
of giving citizens a voice in agency disciplinary decisions and other matters. Therefore, our final
hypothesis is as follows:
3. Deputies who feel public scrutiny has increased recently and made their job more
difficult will afford less legitimacy to their CAC.
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Methodology
Research Setting
Our data were obtained from a survey of a metropolitan sheriff’s department in the
southeastern US. It is the largest law enforcement agency in its state, with 666 sworn deputies
employed at the time of our study. It has five divisions – Uniform, Criminal Investigation,
Special Projects, Professional Standards, and Administration – each under the command of a
Chief Deputy. The Uniform Division is responsible for patrolling the seven regions of the
county, which was home to approximately 398,000 residents according to 2015 American
Community Survey 5-year estimates. Roughly 47% of the residents are white and 46% are
African American. The median household income in 2015 was $49,131. According to the
Uniform Crime Report, there were 2,357 violent crimes and 8,991 property crimes in the
jurisdiction in 2015.
This department has its own CAC – a diverse group of 26 residents of the county that
includes ministers, retired military veterans, academics, and community leaders. The council has
three primary duties:
1. Review citizens’ complaints against deputies
2. Review disciplinary actions against deputies
3. Review departmental policies and procedures
The Sheriff meets with the council approximately four times per year. The council reviews cases
to determine whether they believe the department’s actions were appropriate or not. If not,
Internal Affairs revisits the case. Members are appointed by the Sheriff and serve indefinitely.
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Survey Administration
In February 2015, the first and second authors invited all sworn deputies (N=666) to
participate in an online survey that focused broadly on organizational climate within the
department. To encourage participation, deputies were informed that their identities would
remain anonymous, data would only be analyzed in the aggregate, and only the researchers
would have access to the raw data. The survey was also endorsed by the agency’s deputy
advisory council – a group of respected employees who represent the interests of their colleagues
at routine meetings with command staff. No incentives were offered for participation. Of the 666
deputies eligible to participate, 567 submitted a survey, resulting in an 85.1% response rate. For
the purposes of this study, we were interested in deputies’ attitudes toward their CAC. However,
we recognized it was possible some deputies would not be aware the council existed. Therefore,
we included a filter question that asked “Do you know what the CAC is?” Approximately onehalf of our sample (50.7%; n=288) answered affirmatively (see Figure 1). Accordingly, we
restricted our analytic sample to these 288 deputies who indicated familiarity with the CAC.1
[Figure 1 here]
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable captures deputies’ perceived legitimacy of their CAC. We asked
respondents to indicate their level of agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with
the following statements: “The CAC makes recommendations that have the community’s best

1

An anonymous reviewer pointed out that deputies assigned to patrol might be more likely to indicate familiarity
with the CAC, given the CAC likely focuses on these deputies who are more visible to the community. A chi-square
test of independence indicated no significant differences in CAC familiarity across assignment [χ 2 = .057 (1), p =
.81]. Furthermore, there were no significant differences across race [χ 2 (1) = .79, p = .37], education [χ2 (4) = 4.251,
p = .37], or military background [χ2 (1) = 1.020, p = .31]. However, there were significant differences in CAC
familiarity across age [χ2 (3) = 30.511, p > .000], gender [χ2 (1) = 9.502, p = .002], and experience [χ2 (4) = 26.534,
p < .000], such that older, male, and more experienced deputies were more likely to report being familiar with the
CAC.
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interests in mind,” “The CAC helps maintain our agency’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public,”
and “The CAC helps maintain our agency’s community policing efforts.” The mean KaiserMeyer-Olkin (KMO) index of factorial simplicity was 0.70, indicating sufficient sampling
adequacy (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). Principal factor analysis indicated that responses to the three
items loaded onto a single factor (loadings >.70), and Cronbach’s alpha demonstrated adequate
internal consistency (α=.88). Therefore, we averaged responses to the items to form a mean
index, CAC legitimacy. Higher scores on the index reflect greater perceived legitimacy of the
council. The mean of the index was 3.72. As shown in Figure 2, roughly 60 to 65% of the sample
agreed or strongly agreed with each of the items included in the index. Approximately one-third
of the sample felt neutral about each of the three items, while the remaining 3% disagreed or
strongly disagreed with each. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and all other
variables included in our analyses are presented in Table 1.
[Figure 2 here]
[Table 1 here]
Independent Variables
Organizational justice. Our first hypothesis was that deputies who perceived greater
fairness from command staff would view their CAC as more legitimate. We presented
respondents with eighteen items that captured their perceptions of procedural (e.g., “Command
staff considers employees’ viewpoints”), distributive (e.g., “Command staff treats employees the
same regardless of their race or ethnicity”), and interactional justice (e.g., “Generally, command
staff treats employees with respect”), and asked them to report their level of agreement
(1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with each. A complete list of the items is available in
the Appendix. The mean KMO of .95 indicated sufficient sampling adequacy, and responses
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loaded onto a single factor (loadings >.61). Furthermore, Cronbach’s alpha indicated strong
internal consistency (α=.96). Thus, we averaged responses to the eighteen items to generate a
mean index, Organizational Justice, whereby higher scores represent greater perceived fairness
by the agency’s command staff.
Self-legitimacy. Our second hypothesis was that respondents with greater self-legitimacy
would have higher evaluations of CAC legitimacy. To capture respondents’ level of selflegitimacy, we presented them with a series of statements adapted from Tankebe (2014b).
Specifically, they were asked to indicate their level of agreement (1=strongly disagree to
5=strongly agree) with the following five statements: “I have confidence in the authority vested
in me as a law enforcement officer,” “As a law enforcement officer, I believe I occupy a position
of special importance in society,” “I believe people should always do what I tell them as long as
my orders are lawful,” “I am confident I have enough authority to do my job well,” and “I
believe law enforcement is capable of providing security for all citizens of this county.” The
mean KMO was .73, indicating sufficient sampling adequacy. Responses to the items loaded
onto a single factor (loadings >.43) and Cronbach’s alpha suggested acceptable internal
consistency (α=.66). We averaged responses to the five items to create a mean index, Selflegitimacy, with higher scores indicating greater confidence in one’s authority as a police officer.
Public scrutiny. We also hypothesized that deputies who perceived higher levels of
public scrutiny in recent months would perceive the CAC as less legitimate. Deputies were asked
to report their level of agreement (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with three
statements: “In general US citizens’ views of the police have gotten worse over the past 6
months,” “Over the past 6 months, county residents’ perceptions of law enforcement have gotten
worse,” and “Over the past 6 months, it has become more dangerous to be a law enforcement

13

officer because of negative publicity surrounding law enforcement.”2 The mean KMO was .60
and responses loaded onto a single factor (loadings >.51). Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha suggested
acceptable internal consistency (α=.65). We averaged responses to the three items to generate a
mean index, Public Scrutiny. Higher scores on the index reflect a belief that public attitudes
toward the police have gotten worse, and that it has become more dangerous to be a police
officer, over the previous six months.
Controls
We included seven control variables in our multivariate models in an effort to minimize
concern that any observed relationships between our independent and dependent variables were
spurious. Specifically, we accounted for the respondents’ gender (1=male), race (1=nonwhite),
education level (1=bachelor’s degree or higher), assignment (1=patrol, 0=other assignment), and
military experience (1=yes) with binary variables. We controlled for respondents’ age with an
ordinal variable (1=21 to 30, 2=31 to 40, 3=41 to 50, 4=51 or older) to help ensure anonymity.
Likewise, respondents’ tenure with the agency was measured with an ordinal variable (1=less
than one year, 2=1 to 5 years, 3=6 to 9 years, 4=10 to 15 years, and 5=more than 15 years).
Analytic Strategy
The first step of our analysis was to examine the bivariate relationship between our
dependent variable and each of our three key independent variables of interest. This step served
to establish preliminary evidence that each of the correlations were in the hypothesized
directions. Furthermore, the fact that none of the correlations exceeded |.56| suggested that
multicollinearity would not be a concern in the second step of the analysis (Tabachnick and

2

The survey was administered approximately six months after the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson. An
incredible amount of media attention during this time was devoted to police use of force and public criticism of
police.
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Fidell, 2013). The second step entailed a multivariate analysis. We ran a series of four ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression equations because our dependent variable approximated
normality (skewness= -.251, kurtosis= 3.708). The first three equations included each of our
three key independent variables separately. In turn, the fourth included all three simultaneously.
This process served to help us determine if any of the independent variables appeared to be more
closely associated with deputies’ attitudes toward the legitimacy of the CAC. As an additional
check for multicollinearity, we post-estimated the variance inflation factors, all of which were
less than 1.44. These values fall within acceptable ranges and suggest that multicollinearity is not
a concern in the results below (Belsley et al., 1980).
Results
Table 2 displays a pairwise correlation matrix for the dependent and independent
variables along with each of the controls. Each of the independent variables was correlated with
CAC legitimacy in the hypothesized direction. At the bivariate level, organizational justice
(r=.559, p<.01) appeared most closely related to perceived legitimacy of the CAC. The
correlation between self-legitimacy and CAC legitimacy (r=.132, p<.05), though statistically
significant, was much weaker. As hypothesized, deputies who perceived greater public scrutiny
(r= -.253, p<.01) perceived the CAC as less legitimate, at least at the bivariate level.
Interestingly, deputies assigned to the patrol division (r= -.144, p<.05) also viewed the CAC as
less legitimate relative to their colleagues in other divisions.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 displays each of our OLS regression models. In Model 1, we regressed the
dependent variable onto our organizational justice index along with each of the seven control
variables. The model was statistically significant and explained nearly 38% of the variance in
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deputies’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy. As expected, the organizational justice coefficient was
positive and statistically significant (b=.561, p<.01), net of the demographic statistical control
variables. Note, however, that deputies with military experience expressed significantly more
favorable attitudes toward the CAC than those without military experience (b=.236, p<.01).
[Table 3 here]
Models 2 and 3 regressed CAC legitimacy onto self-legitimacy and public scrutiny,
respectively, along with each of the controls. Note that each of these models explain far less
variation in the outcome (R2=.05 and .09, respectively), and Model 2, as a whole, was not
statistically significant (F-test=1.64, p>.05). Still, both self-legitimacy and public scrutiny were
significantly associated with the outcome in the hypothesized directions, net of the controls. In
Model 4, we ran a fully saturated regression equation that included all three of the key
independent variables along with the controls. The results indicated that perceptions of
organizational justice (b=.562, p<.01) were the most closely connected to CAC legitimacy. In
fact, the effects of self-legitimacy and public scrutiny were reduced to non-significance in this
model after the inclusion of organizational justice. Military background (b=.237, p<.01) was
statistically significant, but a comparison of the standardized coefficients suggested its
relationship with CAC legitimacy (β=.176) was much weaker than that of organizational justice
(β=.622). With these findings in mind, we now turn to a discussion of our study’s implications.
Discussion
Democratic policing integrates the public into police decision making and considers
citizens’ views on agency policies and strategic decision-making (Manning, 2015). Such efforts
have been the focus of key transitions in the history of policing and police-community relations.
For example, rampant corruption during the political era of policing gave way to a more

16

professional style of police beginning around the 1930s that sought to increase the efficiency,
and thereby effectiveness, of policing (Walker, 1998). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, we
witnessed agencies adopt community-oriented policing philosophies to increase transparency and
integrate the public into police decision making (Reisig, 2010). These changes sought to improve
the public’s trust in the police by adhering more wholly to the Peelian principle that the police
are the public and that the public are the police—the essence of democratic policing.
Police agencies have used many strategies to ensure they deliver democratic policing to
the public. Some departments have fundamentally changed their structure and philosophy to
work more closely with their communities to identify problems (Greene, 2000; Maguire, 1997).
Several agencies have gone as far as implementing front porch roll calls—rather than holding
briefings in the station house, they routinely meet in a community member’s front yard (Fox,
2016; Kulmala, 2016). A re-emerging trend, and one advocated by President Obama’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, is the establishment of CACs in an effort to provide more
participation, voice, and transparency to the public. Broadly speaking, these entities strive to
integrate the public into decisions that impact their community. Providing a voice and increasing
transparency sends the message to the public that they are valued members of society and are
active partners with the police. By extension, CACs may serve as a vehicle for improving
communication and cooperation between the police and public and deconstructing barriers
between them.
Establishing and empowering a CAC, therefore, may be beneficial to a police agency and
its community for many reasons. The problem is that CACs may lack legitimacy in the eyes of
officers because they are comprised of “outsiders.” The degree to which officers perceive their
CAC as a legitimate oversight committee likely impacts how successful the council is in
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achieving some of the goals discussed above. A largely unexplored empirical question remains:
what factors are associated with officers’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy? We sought to answer
this question by analyzing survey data from a sample of sheriff deputies in a southeastern
agency. One significant finding from our study was that only about half of the sample indicated
they were aware their agency had a CAC. This is interesting because their CAC oversees all
citizen complaints, deputy disciplinary decisions, and policy changes. The CAC’s deliberations
have a direct impact on the responding deputies’ working environments. Regularly discussing
the CAC with members of an agency is an important first step for departments attempting to gain
buy-in from their officers.
A more positive finding, however, was that among those deputies who were familiar with
their agency’s CAC, most had a favorable evaluation of its legitimacy. It is important to note that
the agency we surveyed has relatively high levels of community support and a positive
relationship with its residents. The Sheriff has been re-elected to the position several times since
the mid-1990s and is well-liked in the community and within the agency. Such characteristics
may help explain why our data demonstrated relatively positive views of the agency’s CAC. At
the same time, however, variation existed in deputies’ attitudes. Thus, understanding what
explains deputies’ perceived legitimacy of the CAC is a critical question.
Consistent with prior research that examined the predictors of support of democratic
styles of policing, we found that perceptions of organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and public
scrutiny were all related to deputies’ evaluations of CAC legitimacy in the expected directions.
However, when all three key theoretical variables were included in a single regression equation,
only the organizational justice effect remained statistically significant. This finding adds to a
growing body of evidence demonstrating the benefit of organizational justice within police
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agencies. Prior research has revealed that organizational justice is associated with beneficial
work-related outcomes among officers—greater support of agency goals, less cynicism, and
greater agency trust (Bradford and Quinton, 2014; Wolfe and Nix, 2016a). Our study shows that
another beneficial outcome of organizational justice is officer buy-in to an important mechanism
of democratic policing—greater perceived legitimacy of CACs. Achieving perceived legitimacy
of CACs appears important because it may lead to a situation where officers can learn from
citizens’ viewpoints, learn from mistakes, make corrective action when necessary, and ultimately
improve the quality of service provided to the community. Additionally, CACs may provide a
great opportunity for members of the public to witness how well trained, self-controlled, and
professional their officers are. Having officers fail to perceive the council as legitimate, however,
may create obstacles for agencies attempting to fulfill these goals. Ensuring a climate of
respectful supervisor treatment, open lines of communication, and transparency with
subordinates will likely cultivate greater perceived legitimacy in an agency’s CAC.
Another key finding was that the organizational justice effect confounded the relationship
between self-legitimacy, public scrutiny, and CAC legitimacy. This is consistent with prior
research showing that organizational justice evaluations outpace the role of perceive negative
publicity on officers’ orientations toward the public (Wolfe and Nix, 2016a). Thus, police
managers can help shield their officers from the potential harmful effects of public scrutiny by
ensuring organizational justice within their agencies (Nix and Wolfe, 2016). This seems
particularly relevant to police managers in a time of tense community relations around the US
(Wolfe and Nix, 2016b).
Our study was not without limitations, which provide avenues for future research. For
one, our sample comes from a single sheriff’s department in the southeast that has relatively
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good community relations. Views of CACs in jurisdictions lacking public confidence may be
fundamentally different than those observed here. Future research should attempt to build on our
findings by exploring officers’ perceptions of CACs in other agencies, particularly those with
strained community relations. Because this was the first study of its kind, we may have
unintentionally failed to account for other potentially important predictors of CAC legitimacy.
For example, officers’ perceptions of other governing bodies (e.g., city/county council, mayor,
city manager) may also impact officers’ views of their agency’s CAC (Crank and Langworthy,
1992). If officers believe the implementation of a CAC or its decisions/recommendations are
influenced by politics, for example, this may have a negative effect on officers’ evaluations of
the committee’s legitimacy. Relatedly, the Sheriff handpicks community members to serve on
the CAC. It is possible that a more democratic and transparent selection process would improve
deputies’ perceptions of the council. Finally, it would be interesting for future researchers to
explore how officers’ evaluations of CACs change over time and determine what factors explain
those changes. Can high profile or controversial use of force investigations or officer disciplinary
recommendations influence officers’ perceptions of their CAC?
The US is a democracy, and our government agencies purport to serve our interests and
desires. As a result, we have witnessed further integration of the community into police decisionmaking processes over the years. This move toward a more democratic style of policing is
necessary to ensure community trust, perceived legitimacy, public cooperation, and compliance
with the law (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002). Agencies that do not actively pursue strategies
for community integration risk sending the message that the public’s voice is not valued. This
could ultimately erode trust, legitimacy, cooperation, and compliance over time. CACs are one
way for agencies to deliver democratic policing to the public. Having such a council does not
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mean that agencies, their executives, or their officers need to bow to public opinion. After all, the
police have their own set of expertise that is distinct from that of the public. But, agencies should
not ignore the voice and opinions of citizens who sit on such councils. Democratic policing is
policing that acknowledges the role of the public in helping police itself.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable
CAC legitimacy
Organizational justice
Self-legitimacy
Public scrutiny
Male
Nonwhite
Age
Bachelor’s Degree
Experience
Patrol
Military

N
285
287
287
288
272
267
274
273
267
269
272

Mean/%
3.527
3.641
4.144
3.578
80.5%
27.3%
2.741
56.0%
3.543
39.8%
39.0%

29

SD
.636
.754
.547
.766
—
—
.981
—
1.180
—
—

Min
1
1
2
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

Max
5
5
5
5
1
1
4
1
5
1
1

Table 2. Pairwise correlation matrix.
Variable
Y1 CAC legitimacy

X1

N

Y1
1.000
285

N

.559**
284

1.000
287

N

.132*
284

.264**
287

1.000
287

N

-.253**
285

-.333**
287

.006
287

1.000
288

N

.018
269

.014
271

.023
271

-.117
272

1.000
272

N

-.022
265

-.062
266

.141*
266

-.039
267

-.035a
263

1.000
267

N

.104
271

.184**
273

.120*
273

-.155*
274

.094
270

.168**
264

1.000
274

N

.016
271

-.069
272

.001
272

.122*
273

-.205a
269

-.151a
265

-.086
270

1.000
273

N

.078
264

.000
266

.041
266

-.114
267

.097
263

.033
259

.461**
265

.027
265

1.000
267

N

-.144*
266

-.230**
268

-.012
268

.089
269

.370**a
265

-.126a
262

-.260**
267

-.107a
267

-.212**
263

1.000
269

N

.075
269

-.080
271

.084
271

-.056
272

.419**a
268

.308**a
264

.116
269

-.254*a
270

-.046
264

.218*a
267

X1 Organizational justice
X2 Self-legitimacy
X3 Public scrutiny
X4 Male
X5 Nonwhite
X6 Age
X7 Bachelor’s degree
X8 Experience
X9 Patrol
X10 Military

X2

X3

X4

NOTE: Correlations are Pearson’s r (two-tailed test) unless otherwise noted.
aTetrachoric correlation (Spearman’s rho; two-tailed test).
*p<.05;**p<.01
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X5

X6

X7

X8

X9

X10

1.000
272

Table 3. The effects of organizational justice, self-legitimacy, and public scrutiny on CAC legitimacy.
Variable
Org. justice
Self-legitimacy
Public scrutiny
Male
Nonwhite
Age
Bachelor’s degree
Experience
Patrol
Military
Intercept
F-test
R2 (Adj. R2)
N

b
.561**
—
—
-.011
.013
-.043
.107
.059
.001
.236**
1.433**

Model 1
SE
.050
—
—
.093
.078
.041
.070
.033
.076
.075
.242
17.78**
. 375(.354)
246

β
.621
—
—
-.007
.009
-.064
.080
.107
.001
.175
—

b
—
.155*
—
.059
-.119
.040
.020
.007
-.175
.139
2.955**

Model 2
SE
—
.078
—
.114
.095
.049
.086
.040
.092
.092
.357

β
—
.128
—
.034
-.082
.061
.015
.013
-.131
.103
—

1.64
.053(.021)
246

b
—
—
-.192**
.026
-.100
.039
.066
.000
-.153
.142
4.303**

Model 3
SE
—
—
.054
.113
.093
.048
.085
.039
.090
.091
.282
2.86**
.088(.057)
247

*p<.05;**p<.01
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β
—
—
-.227
.015
-.069
.059
.049
-.001
-.115
.105
—

b
.562**
-.044
-.022
-.014
.020
-.042
.113
.058
.006
.237**
1.688**

Model 4
SE
.056
.067
.048
.093
.079
.041
.071
.033
.076
.076
.388
14.23**
.377(.351)
246

β
.622
-.037
-.026
-.008
.014
-.063
.085
.105
.004
.176
—

Figure 1. Percentage of respondents who indicated they knew what the CAC was (N=567).
Missing
n = 107
18.87%

Yes
n = 288
50.79%

No
n = 172
30.34%
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Figure 2. Perceived legitimacy of the CAC (restricted to those who indicated they knew what it
was; N=288).
1.39%

The CAC makes recommendations
that have the community’s best
interests in mind.

13.19%
50.00%
32.29%
2.78%
0.35%
1.04%

14.24%

The CAC helps maintain our
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

52.08%
29.51%
2.78%
0.35%
1.39%
9.03%

The CAC helps us maintain our
community policing efforts.

50.00%
36.11%
3.13%
0.35%

0%
Missing

Strongly agree

10%
Agree

20%
Neutral

33

30%
Disagree

40%
Strongly disagree

50%

60%

Appendix
Organizational Justice Items
1. My agency’s policies are designed to generate standards so that decisions can be made
with consistency.
2. My agency’s policies are designed to allow employees to have a voice in agency
decisions (e.g., assignment changes, discipline).
3. My agency’s performance evaluation system is fair.
4. My agency’s investigation of civilian complaints is fair.
5. I understand clearly what type of behavior will result in discipline within my agency.
6. Landing a good assignment in my agency is based on whom you know (reverse coded).
7. If you work hard, you can get ahead at this agency.
8. As an organization, my agency can be trusted to do what is right for the community.
9. I trust the direction that my department’s command staff is taking our agency.
10. I feel confident about top management’s skills.
11. Command staff considers employees’ viewpoints.
12. Command staff treats employees with kindness and consideration.
13. Command staff treats employees the same regardless of their gender.
14. Command staff treats employees the same regardless of their race or ethnicity.
15. Command staff clearly explains the reasons for their decisions.
16. Command staff clearly explains the reasons the agency makes policy changes.
17. Generally, command staff treats employees with respect.
18. I trust that command staff makes decisions that have the agency’s best interest in mind.
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